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The problem: Is the CBC MAC secure?
Message authentication lets communicating partners who share a secret key verify that a received message originates with the party who claims to have sent it. This is one of the most important and widely used cryptographic tools. It is most often achieved using a \message authentication code," or MAC. This is a short string MAC a (x) computed on the message x to be authenticated and the shared secret key a. The sender transmits hx; MAC a (x)i and the receiver, who gets hx 0 ; 0 i, veri es that 0 = MAC a (x 0 ). The most common MAC is built using the idea of \cipher block chaining" some underlying block cipher. To discuss this we rst need some notation. Given a function f: f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g l and a number m 1 we denote by f (m) : f0; 1g ml ! f0; 1g l the function which maps an ml-bit input x = x 1 x m (jx i j = l) to the l-bit string x m?1 ) x m ) :
We call f (m) the (m-fold) cipher block chaining of f. 1 Now, a block cipher F (with key length k and block size l) speci es a family of permutations f a : f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g l , one for each k-bit key a. The CBC MAC constructed from F has an associated parameter s < l which is the number of bits it outputs. The CBC MAC is then de ned for any ml-bit string The CBC MAC is an International Standard 13] . The most popular and widely used special case uses F = DES (so k = 56 and l = 64) and s = 32, in which case we recover the de nition of the corresponding U.S. Standard 1] . These standards are extensively employed in the banking sector and in other commercial sectors. Given this degree of usage and standardization, you might expect that there would be a large body of work aimed at learning if the CBC MAC is secure. Yet this has not really been the case. To the best of our knowledge, it was seen as entirely possible that F could be a perfectly secure block cipher even though CBC-MAC F might be a completely insecure MAC. There was no reason to be sure that the internal structure of F couldn't \interact badly" with the speci cs of cipher block chaining in exactly such a way as to defeat the CBC MAC.
Our approach
In this paper we will show that CBC MAC construction is secure if the underlying block cipher is secure. To make this statement meaningful we need rst to discuss what we mean by security in each case. 1 Notice that here and in what follows we require the input to consist of exactly m blocks, not at most m. See Section 1.4 for a discussion of length variability.
What does it mean to assume DES is secure?
To describe the security of a block cipher we adopt the viewpoint introduced by Luby and Racko 15, 16] with regard to DES. They suggest that a block cipher should be assumed to be a pseudorandom function (PRF) with respect to \practical" computation. The notion of a PRF is in turn due to Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali 9] . Roughly said, a function family F is pseudorandom if any reasonable adversary is unable to distinguish the following two types of objects, based on their input/output behavior: a black-box for f a ( ), on a random key a; a black-box for a \truly random" function f( ).
What does it mean for a MAC to be secure?
Our notion of security for a message authentication code adopts the viewpoint of Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest 11] with regard to signature schemes; namely, a secure MAC must resist existential forgery under adaptive message attack. However, what we will show is actually stronger: if F is a pseudorandom function family then F (m) , the family of functions f (m) for f 2 F, is itself shown to be a pseudorandom function family. That a PRF automatically makes a secure message authentication code is a well-known observation due to 9, 10]|see Section 6 for details.
Exact security
We wish to obtain results which are meaningful for practice. In particular, in our setting we need to say something about the correct or incorrect use of DES, where there are no asymptotics present. This demands not only that we avoid asymptotics and address security \exactly," but also that we strive for security reductions which are as e cient as possible. We will only talk about nite families of functions and the resources needed to \learn" things about these nite function families. We will describe the resources necessary to \break" the nite family F given an adversary of speci ed resources who succeeds in breaking F (m) . The parameters of interest are the running time t of the adversary; the number of queries q which she makes to an oracle which is her only point of access to f( )-values for the given f 2 F; and the adversary's advantage, , over simple guessing. We emphasize the importance of keeping t and q separate: in practice, oracle queries correspond to observations or interaction with a system whose overall structure often severely limits q (e.g., the system might limit the amount of plaintext encrypted before the key is changed); but t corresponds to o -line computation by the adversary, and so is much less under the good guys control.
Assume that adversary A can (t; q; )-break F (m) . This means she runs in time t, makesueries of her oracle, and succeeds with advantage in distinguishing a random member of F (m) from a random function of ml-bits to l-bits. Our results specify (t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 ) (as functions of t; q; ; m; l) such that there exists an adversary A 0 (a simple modi cation of A) that (t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 )-breaks F.
Exact security is not new. It is true that most theoretical works only provide asymptotic security guarantees of the form \the success probability of a polynomially bounded adversary is negligible" (everything measured as a function of the security parameter), but the exact security can usually be derived from examination of the proof. However, a lack of concern with the exactness means that in many cases the reductions are very ine cient, and the results are not useful for practice. Previous works which address exact security explicitly and strive for e cient reductions are 8, 12, 19, 6, 14, 4] , the last four on the more practical side. (m) are e ectively ruled out. Thus, we reduce the security of DES (m) to that of DES in a constructive and useful way. The brunt of the proof addresses the information-theoretic case of the above lemma. Here we consider the problem of distinguishing a random ml-bit to l-bit function from the m-fold CBC of a random l-bit to l-bit function. We prove an absolute bound of 3q The proof of this information-theoretic case of the CBC Lemma is not easy. For whatever reasons, it seems quite susceptible to specious arguments and to a general di culty in moving from intuition to proof. Section 6 completes the picture by showing that the standard construction of a MAC from a PRF has tight security. In this light, we view our main results as being those discussed above.
Extensions and corollaries
The CBC Lemma provides an e cient method to produce a PRF to l-bits when the input is of xed length ml. But often the input lengths may vary. We exhibit in Section 5 some simple extensions to the CBC MAC which allow one to correctly authenticate words of arbitrary length.
We also demonstrate that a mechanism which is commonly employed |setting MAC f (x 1 x m ) = f (m+1) (x 1 x m m)| does not work to generate a secure message authentication code.
Pseudorandom functions are basic tools in cryptography. In addition to shedding light on the security of the CBC MAC our work provides a method of building secure PRFs which can be used in a wide range of applications, in the following way. Practice readily provides PRFs on xed input lengths, in the form of block ciphers like DES. On the other hand PRFs are very useful in applications, but one typically needs PRFs on long strings. Our CBC Lemma provides a provably-good way of extending the basic PRFs (which work on short inputs) to PRFs which work on longer inputs. It was based on these facts that PRFs were suggested by 3] as the tools of choice for practical applications, particularly entity authentication and key distribution.
History and related work
The lack of any theorem linking the security of f to that of f (m) lead previous users of the CBC-MAC to view f (m) , and not f, as the basic primitive. Thus for example in Bird et. al. 5] , when the authors require a practical message authentication code in order to achieve their higher-level goal of entity authentication they made appropriate assumptions about the CBC MAC. The cryptanalytic approach to the problem of the security of the CBC MAC is to attack the CBC MAC construction for a particular block cipher F. Refer to 17] for an attempt to directly attack the DES CBC MAC using di erential cryptanalysis. Another approach to studying MACs is rooted in the examination of protocols which use them. Stubblebine and Gligor 20] nd aws in the use of the CBC MAC in some well-known protocols. But as the authors make clear, it is not the CBC MAC itself which is at fault for the indicated protocol failures|it is the manner in which the containing protocols incorrectly embed the CBC MAC. The authors go on to correct some protocols by having them properly use the CBC MAC. Cipher block chaining is not the only method of constructing a MAC out of a block cipher. Amongst the other methods that have been proposed we note that of 2]. There the authors concern was to provide a construction which, unlike cipher-block chaining, is parallelizable. Their constructions are simple and e cient. The security is analyzed exactly and the bounds achieved are actually somewhat better than what we prove here for cipher block chaining.
Discussion and open questions
Block ciphers like DES are in fact permutations. One open question is whether the permutativity of the block cipher could be exploited to prove a stronger reduction than that in our main lemma. The fact that one typically outputs a number of bits s < l seems relevant and useful in strengthening the bounds that would otherwise be achieved. 
Preliminaries
A nite function family is a nite set of strings, called keys, each of which names a function according to a xed and speci ed manner. To pick a function f at random from a nite function family F means to pick a random key and let f be the corresponding function. Note that two keys can name the same function.
We let R a!l denote the set of all functions from f0; 1g a to f0; 1g l . The name of each function f 2 R a!l is the string which describes its truth table. We let R l!l denote the set of all functions from 1 i<2 l f0; 1g il to f0; 1g l . The name of a function f 2 R l!l is the string which describes its truth 
Proof
Fix an adversary A. Since we are not restricting computation time a standard argument shows that we may assume without loss of generality that A is deterministic. The bulk of the proof will be devoted to seeing what happens when A is supplied with a g be chosen at random from R (m) l!l . We begin with some de nitions. The connection of these de nitions to the game we are considering will be made later.
Query sequences and labelings. Call the 2 l -ary rooted tree of depth m the full tree. A sequence x 1 : : :x i of l-bit strings (1 i m) names a node at depth i in the natural way. The root is denoted . A sequence of distinct non-root nodes X 1 ; : : :; X n is a query sequence if for every i there is a j < i such that the parent of X i is either X j or . The query tree associated to a query sequence X 1 ; : : :; X n is the (rooted) subtree of the full tree induced by the nodes f ; X 1 ; : : :; X n g; it consists of a collection of root emanating paths. Nodes at depth m are called border nodes. A labeling of a query sequence is a map assigning an l-bit string to each node (equivalently, a map assigning an l-bit string to each non-root node of the query tree). A function f: f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g l induces a labeling Z f of a query sequence X 1 ; : : :; X n as follows. Let ; x 1 ; x 1 x 2 ; : : :; x 1 x 2 : : :x i be any root emanating path in the query tree. Set A labeling of the query sequence X 1 ; : : :; X n is said to be collision free if the n values Z(X 1 ); : : :; Z(X n ) are distinct and also the n values Y (X 1 ); : : :; Y (X n ) are distinct, where Y is the input labeling induced by Z. A border labeling of a query sequence is a map assigning an l-bit string to each border node in the query tree. A labeling Z is consistent with a border labelingẐ if the two agree on the border nodes.
A New view of the game. A query x 1 : : :x m of the adversary to the g-oracle can be thought of as specifying a root to border path in the full tree. Now imagine a slightly di erent game in which the adversary has more power. She can sequentially make qm queries, each a node in the full tree, with the restriction that her queries form a query sequence X 1 ; : : :; X qm according to the above de nition. She receives no answer to queries which are internal nodes of the full tree, but when she queries a border node she receives its Z f value. It is easy to see that it su ces to prove the lemma for this game.
The basic random variables. The query sequence, its Z f -labeling, and the values returned to the adversary are all random variables over the random choice of f 2 R l!l . We will denote by X 1 ; : : :; X qm the random variables which are the queries of A. We will denote by Z n (resp. b Z n ) the labeling of X 1 ; : : :; X n (resp. of the border nodes of the query tree associated to X 1 ; : : :; X n ) speci ed by Z f . The input labeling induced by Z n is denoted Y n . The view of A after her n-th query is the random variable View n = (X 1 ; : : :; X n ; b Z n ). The term labeling usually refers to a value of Z n ; when we want to discuss the induced labeling we talk of the induced or input labeling.
Equi-probability of collision-free labelings. The following lemma xes the number n of queries that A has made. It then xes a particular view (X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ) of A. It now examines the distribution on labelings from the point of view of A. It says that as far as A can tell, all collision free labelings of X 1 ; : : :; X n consistent with her current view are equally likely. The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
More definitions. Let X 1 ; : : :; X n be a query sequence. We will discuss labelingsz which assign values only to some speci ed subset S of this sequence. The input labeling induced byz assigns values to all nodes of X 1 ; : : :; X n which are at level one and all nodes whose parents are in S. We can discuss collision freeness of such labelings, or their consistency with a border labeling, in the usual way. We denote by Z S n the labeling of S given by restricting Z n to S. Let ColFree(Z) be true if labeling Z is collision free. Unpredictability of internal labels. The following lemma xes the number n of queries that A has made, as well as a particular view X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ of A. It now makes the assumption that the current labeling Z n is collision free; think of this fact as being known to A. Given all this, it examines the distribution on labels from the point of view of A. Some labels are known:
for example, the Z n values of border nodes and the Y n values of nodes at depth one. The lemma says that all other labels are essentially unpredictable. First, it considers a node x 1 : : :x i x i+1 which is at depth at least two, and says that even given the output labels (i.e. Z n values) of all nodes except its parent x 1 : : :x i , the Y n value of x 1 : : :x i x i+1 is almost uniformly distributed. Second, it considers a node x 1 : : :x i which is not a border node, and says that even given the output labels of all other nodes, the Z n value of x 1 : : :x i is almost uniformly distributed. For technical reasons the lemma requires a bound on the number n of queries that have been made. Lemma 3.3 Let 1 n qm?1 and suppose n 2 =4 + n ? 1 2 l =2. Let X 1 ; : : :; X n be a query sequence and letẐ be a labeling of the border nodes of X 1 ; : : :; X n . Let
Pr n ] = Pr h j View n = (X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ)^ColFree(Z n ) i : Suppose x 1 : : :x i 2 fX 1 ; : : :; X n g is a non-border node and let S = fX 1 ; : : :; X n g ? fx 1 : : :x i g. Supposez: S ! f0; 1g l is a collision free labeling of S which is consistent withẐ. The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Bounding the probability of collisions. The following lemma xes the number n of queries that A has made, as well as a particular view X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ of A. It now makes the assumption that the current labeling Z n is collision free; think of this fact as being known to A. Given all this, it considers A's adding a new node X n+1 to the tree. It says that the labeling is likely to retain its collision freeness; that is, Z n+1 is collision free with high probability. The same technical condition on n as in the previous lemma is required. Note that X n+1 is determined by X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ. The value Z n+1 (X n+1 ) has not yet been returned to A, and it makes sense to discuss the distribution of this value given X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ.
Lemma 3.4 Let 1 n qm?1 and suppose n 2 =4 + n ? 1 2 l =2. Let X 1 ; : : :; X n be a query sequence and letẐ be a labeling of the border nodes of X 1 ; : : :; X n . Then The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Concluding the proof. We now complete the proof of Lemma 1 given the lemmas above. We need to show that advantage A (R ml!l ; R (m) l!l ) 3q 2 m 2 2 ?l?1 . We rst consider running A in the above game, with g = f (m) for f chosen at random from R l!l ]. As long as the current labeling Z n which A has is collision-free, the value of a border node returned to A is a random l bit string distributed independently of anything else. Thus the distribution on A's view is the same as if she were replied to by a function from R l!l . On the other hand if the labeling Z n has a collision we pessimistically declare that A has won and stop the game. Thus, if Pr R ] denotes the probability function when g is drawn randomly from R ml!l and Pr C ] denotes the probability function when g is drawn randomly from R 4 The CBC Lemma: The computational case Let F be a family of functions of l bits to l bits. Think of it as a family of pseudorandom functions. (For concreteness, we could consider F = fDES a g jaj=56 to be the family of functions speci ed by the DES algorithm; each individual function is speci ed by a 56 bit key.) Thus it is \hard" to distinguish a random member of F from a random function of l bits to l bits. With f drawn randomly from F, we want to see how f (m) compares to a random function of ml bits to l bits. We'd like to say that f (m) is also pseudorandom. The lemma that follows implies this. But the actual statement is much stronger. It says exactly how the security of F (m) relates to that of F. The constant c is a small number which depends only on the underlying machine model. One should think of t as being much larger than cqml (this is apparent from the de nition of the U below) and so the additive cqml term is e ectively irrelevant.
Proof: We may assume > def = 3q 2 m 2 2 ?l?1 since otherwise there is nothing to prove. Let A be an adversary which (t; q; )-distinguishes R ml!l from F (m) . From the triangle inequality at least one of the following must be true: However given the assumed bound on qm and the Information Theoretic CBC Lemma (Lemma 1), the rst option is ruled out. Thus the second must be true. To complete the proof we now construct an adversary A 0 which (t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 )-distinguishes R l!l from F. A 0 is given access to an oracle for a function f: f0; 1g l ! f0; 1g l . Observe that A 0 can compute the function f (m) and doing this at a point x 1 x m costs A 0 a total of m queries to its f-oracle and time proportional to ml. Algorithm A 0 's procedure is to run A and answer its oracle queries according to f (m) . Finally A 0 takes A's prediction as its own. We leave to the reader to check that
This completes the proof.
Length Variability
For simplicity, let us assume throughout this section that strings to be authenticated have length which is a multiple of l bits. This restriction is easy to dispense with by using simple and wellknown padding methods: for example, always append a \1" and then append the minimal number of 0's to make the string a multiple of l bits.
The CBC MAC doesn't handle variable-length inputs. The CBC MAC does not directly give a method to authenticate messages of variable input lengths. In fact, if the length of strings is allowed to vary, it is easy to \break" the basic CBC MAC construction. (This fact is well-known.)
As an example, if you request f (1) a of b, getting back t b , and then you request f (1) a (t b ), getting back t t b , then you have just learned the authentication tag f (2) a (b 0) = t tx for b 0|a string for which you have not asked the authentication tag. Methods which do work. Despite the failure of the method which appends the message length, there are many methods which are almost as simple and which work correctly. We describe three.
In each, let F be a block cipher on l bits. (m x 1 x m ). The corresponding nite function family F is not only a MAC, it can be shown to be computationally close to R l!l .
The third of these claims has the most involved proof. We know of no argument which does not involve modifying and verifying that the proof of the CBC Lemma goes through after making this extension.
From PRFs to MACs
Recall that justifying the CBC-MAC was the primary motivation of this paper. To formally complete this project we need one more step|to show that pseudorandom functions make good message authentication codes. As we remarked in the introduction the reduction is standard 9, 10]. But we need to see what is the exact security. The following shows that the reduction is almost tight| security hardly degrades at all.
Let G be a nite function family whose keys name functions in R k!l . Let MAC G be de ned by MAC G g (y) = g(y) for all g 2 G and all y 2 f0; 1g k . Security of MAC G is discussed via the notion of chosen message attack 11]. An adversary B attacks MAC G via the following experiment. Pick g at random from G and provide MAC G g ( ) to B as an oracle. Suppose B makes q oracle queries and runs for time t, halting with an output (y; ), where y 2 f0; 1g k and y is di erent from any string which B has queried of its oracle. We say that B is successful if MAC G g (y) = . We say that B (t; q; )-breaks MAC G if it is successful with probability at least . The Proposition that follows is the exact security version of the standard reduction of 9, 10]. The proof is concluded by using the inductive hypothesis. We now justify the above equations.
Since X n is not a border node, it is determined by X 1 ; : : :; X n?1 ;Ẑ n?1 . This means that That the second term in the above product is 1 is because V n contains^ as the value of Z n (X n ).
The proof for this case is concluded by applying Equation 1.
A. Proof of (1). Let's begin by giving some intuition for the proof. We observe that withz given, if we assign an input label y 2 f0; 1g l to x 1 : : :x i x i+1 then the value of Z n at the parent node x 1 : : :x i is determined; given this, the values of Y n at the other children of x 1 : : :x i are also determined. Thus, both Z n and Y n are now fully determined for all nodes X 1 ; : : :; X n . We will show that there is a large set S(z) of these y values for which the determined labeling is collision free. Moreover, all collision free labelings have this form and are equally likely by Lemma 2; thus as far as A can tell, the value at x 1 : : :x i x i+1 is equally likely to be anything from the set S(z). Let S(z) be the set of all strings y such that Zz ;y is a collision free labeling. We leave to the reader to check that y 6 2 S(z) if and only if one of the following two conditions is satis ed:
(1) Either y x 1 i+1 2 fz(X j ) : 1 j n and X j 6 = x 1 : : :x i g; or (2) For some u 2 f1; : : :; sg it is the case that y x 1 i+1 x u i+1 2 fỹ(X j ) : 1 j n and X j 6 2 children(x 1 : : :x i ) g. This implies that jf0; 1g l ?S(z)j (n?1)+(n?s)s n?1+n 2 =4 2 l =2. So jS(z)j 2 l ?2 l =2 2 l =2. Now observe that any collision free labeling equals Zz ;y for somez; y as above. Furthermore by Lemma 2 all collision free labelings are equally likely. From this one can prove the desired statement.
Proof of (2) . The idea is very similar to the above. This time, observe that withz given, if we assign an output label z 2 f0; 1g l to x 1 : : :x i then the values of both Z n and Y n are fully determined for all nodes X 1 ; : : :; X n . We show as before that there is a set S(z) of these z values for which the determined labeling is collision free, and conclude as before using the equi-probability of collision free labelings. The formal proof follows.
Let z 2 f0; 1g l be some xed string. Now de ne the labeling Zz ;z : fX 1 ; : : :; X n g ! f0; 1g l by:
Zz ;z (X j ) = (z (X j ) if X j 6 = x 1 : : :x i z otherwise.
Let Yz ;z denote the input labeling induced by Zz ;z , and observe that it is given by Yz ;z (X j ) = (ỹ (X j ) if X j 6 2 children(x 1 : : :x i ) z x u i+1 if X j = x 1 : : :x i x u i+1 for some 1 u s.
Let S(z) be the set of all strings z such that Zz ;z is a collision free labeling. We leave to the reader to check that z 6 2 S(z) if and only if one of the following two conditions is satis ed:
(1) Either z 2 fz(X j ) : 1 j n and X j 6 = x 1 : : :x i g; or (2) For some u 2 f1; : : :; sg it is the case that z x u i+1 2 fỹ(X j ) : 1 j n and X j 6 2 children(x 1 : : :x i ) g. This implies that jf0; 1g l ?S(z)j (n ?1)+(n?s)s n ?1+n 2 =4 2 l =2. So jS(z)j 2 l =2. Now observe that any collision free labeling equals Zz ;z for somez; z as above. Furthermore by Lemma 2 all collision free labelings are equally likely. From this one can prove the desired statement.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
We'll use the following notation:
Pr n ] = Pr h j View n = (X 1 ; : : :; X n ;Ẑ)^ColFree(Z n ) i :
Case 1. X n+1 is at level one. Let X n+1 = x 1 . Note its input label is by de nition x 1 . For each t = 1; : : :; n we claim that Pr n Y n (X t ) = x 1 ] 2 2 ?l : (2) To see why this is true, consider two cases. First, if X t is at level one then Pr n Y n (X t ) = x 1 ] = 0 by de nition. On the other hand suppose X t is at depth at least two. Then X t = x 1 : : :x i x i+1 is the child of some x 1 : : :x i 2 fX 1 ; : : :; X n g. Equation 2 now follows by Part 1 of Lemma 3.
